Chengcheng Wang

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Education

University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ — 2027 (expected)
- Ph.D. in Economics
- Dissertation committee: Andreas Blume (chair), Laurent Mathevet, Matthijs Wildenbeest

Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan — 2020
- M.A. in Economics

Sichuan University, Chengdu, China — 2016
- B.B.A. in Accounting

Research Interests

Microeconomic Theory, Industrial Organization, Information Economics, Digital Economics

Job Market Paper

[1] Differentially Private Market Segmentation

Abstract: Access to consumer data enables firms to segment markets and charge different prices to different consumers, but the use of such data raises privacy concerns. This paper studies monopoly price discrimination under differential privacy, which limits how much segmentation can reveal about consumers' valuations. We characterize the attainable combinations of consumer and producer surplus, which form a convex polygon when valuations are finite. Relative to unrestricted disclosure, differential privacy lowers the firm's maximum profit and raises minimum consumer surplus while reducing its maximum. We show that every segmentation that maximizes consumer surplus leaves the firm with its uniform monopoly profit. Under an upper-tail demand bound, minimum consumer surplus can also be attained at this profit level. Our analysis clarifies how privacy regulation shapes the benefits and harms of market segmentation and informs debates over the use of consumer data in pricing.

Working Papers

[2] Strategic Information Disclosure in Algorithmic Pricing (with Zexin Ye)

Abstract: As firms increasingly adopt AI-powered pricing algorithms, a key and urgent policy concern is how to regulate the potential algorithmic collusion. This paper studies the regulation of algorithmic collusion through information design when firms delegate pricing to Q-learning algorithms under stochastic demand. A third-party intermediary commits to one of three disclosure rules: no disclosure, full disclosure, or upper censorship. Upper censorship truthfully reveals low-demand states while pooling high-demand states and yields higher profits than full disclosure, consistent with theoretical predictions. However, the profit ranking of no disclosure and full disclosure reverses the theoretical benchmark's prediction: no disclosure yields higher profits at high discount factors, whereas full disclosure yields higher profits at low discount factors. These findings suggest that limiting information sharing may raise profits when pricing algorithms are sufficiently patient, complicating efforts to regulate algorithmic collusion.

[3] Communicating with Self-Confidence

Abstract: How do people address self-confidence-concerned audiences? This paper analyzes this question under the framework of strategic communication games proposed by Crawford and Sobel (1982) by assuming the receiver cares about the expectation of his ability, i.e., his self-confidence. No fully revealing equilibrium exists even if the sender's and the receiver's preferences are aligned. Indeed, all equilibria in this game are interval partitional as in Crawford and Sobel (1982). In the uniform quadratic environment, the partition equilibria resemble those in standard cheap talk games.

Selected Work in Progress

[4] Endogenous Cheap Talk in Algorithmic Pricing (with Zexin Ye)

Conferences

2026 Midwest Theory Conference (Ohio State); CES China Annual Conference (Chengdu); Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory (Stony Brook); ASU/UA Econ Job Market Conference (Arizona State)

Grants, Honors & Awards

George W. Coleman Scholarship, University of Arizona	2025
Elmer J. Brown Memorial Scholarship, University of Arizona	2025
Graduate Fellowship, University of Arizona	2020
Scholarship for Graduate Study, Kyoto University	2018

Teaching Experience

Instructor

- ECON 431 Game Theory (In person) — Fall 2023
- ECON 300 Microeconomic Analysis for Business Decisions (Online) — Summer 2022
- ECON 200 Basic Economic Issues (Online) — Summer 2024

Teaching Assistant

- ECON 531 Game Theory (Graduate Level) — 2022
- ECON 431 Game Theory — 2022-2023
- ECON 370 China's Economic Development — 2025
- ECON 361 Intermediate Microeconomics — 2021
- ECON 300 Microeconomic Analysis for Business Decisions — 2024
- ECON 200 Basic Economic Issues — 2021, 2024, 2025
- BNAD 301 Financial Markets and Business Decisions — 2022, 2024, 2026
- BNAD 277 Analytical Methods in Business — 2024
- MIS 304 Using and Managing Information Systems — 2026

Skills

Programming: Python, R, MATLAB
Language: Mandarin (Native), English (Fluent), Japanese (Fluent, JLPT-N1)

References

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Updated October 30, 2026